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Abstract:  We decompose earnings quality into revenue and expense quality and examine their 
associations with analyst propensity to supplement their earnings forecasts with revenue 
forecasts. Analysts report more revenue forecasts to I/B/E/S when expense quality is low to 
compensate for the low accuracy of their earnings estimates, which has a positive association 
with expense quality. Expense quality is unassociated with revenue forecast accuracy, thus 
revenue forecasts become increasingly useful for valuing firms when expense quality is low. 
Analysts report fewer revenue forecasts when revenue quality is low because both earnings and 
revenue forecast accuracy decline as revenue quality deteriorates. To control for endogeneity, we 
use firm-fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across firms, 
instrumental variables regressions and regression in changes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Analysts routinely report their earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts to I/B/E/S, but 
complement only some of these with revenue forecasts.1 This study considers the associations of 
revenue and expense quality with analysts’ propensity to report revenue forecasts with their EPS 
forecasts to I/B/E/S. Our intuition is that low revenue and expense quality increase earnings 
forecasting difficulties and reduce the accuracy and value relevance of analysts’ EPS forecasts 
(Bradshaw et al., 2001; Hughes et al., 2008). This in turn increases investors’ reliance on and 
demand for complementary information.2 We argue that low quality expenses increase the 
investor demand for complementary information in the form of revenue forecasts and analysts 
respond by reporting more revenue forecasts. We also argue that low quality revenues will reduce 
the reporting of revenue forecasts as a result of both a decrease in demand and analysts’ 
reluctance to report low quality forecasts.        
 To examine the associations of revenue and expense quality with analysts’ decisions to 
report a revenue forecast with an earnings forecast, we consider I/B/E/S reported annual EPS 
and revenue forecasts over the fiscal years 2000–2013.  We focus on I/B/E/S reported 
forecasts, rather than on the revenue forecasts in analysts’ investment reports, as only the 
voluntary nature of reporting to I/B/E/S allows us to examine when and how analysts respond 
to investor demand for revenue forecasts. Specifically, investment reports routinely include 
revenue forecasts as part of the forecasted income statements. With a standard research report 
setup, analysts will include revenue forecasts in their investment reports even if (1) there is no 
demand for the forecast because the EPS estimate is already of high quality (e.g. when revenue 
and expense quality are high) and (2) the revenue forecast is of such low quality that investors 
                                                          
1 To illustrate, in our sample of the 853,789 individual analyst earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S over the period 
2000–2013, over 55.1% are supplemented by revenue estimates.  
2 Revenue forecasts are useful as they permit investors to supplement earnings based valuations with revenue based 
assessments and achieve greater accuracy (Beatty et al., 1999 and Yoo, 2006). Furthermore, revenue forecasts 
provide an ex-ante check on the quality of EPS forecasts. Specifically, revenue forecasts enable investors to 
decompose EPS forecasts into forecasts of revenues and expenses and pay particular attention to the contribution 
of the former, more persistent component of the earnings forecast (Ertimur et al., 2003). 
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would ignore it. I/B/E/S does not require analysts to report revenue forecasts, hence voluntary 
revenue reporting to I/B/E/S is more likely to capture (1) investor demand for the forecast and 
(2) analyst inclination to report a useful revenue forecast.  
  I/B/E/S is an important medium for analysts to disseminate their forecasts and 
investors pay close attention to the type and quality of forecasts supplied to I/B/E/S. Ivkovic 
and Jegadeesh (2004, p.434) emphasize that “investors pay millions of dollars every year to 
purchase forecast and recommendation data from vendors such as First Call, I/B/E/S, and 
Zacks.”. Furthermore, analysts issue their full reports much less frequently than they issue 
forecasts to I/B/E/S.3 Ertimur et al. (2011) point out that access to I/B/E/S forecasts reduces 
information search and processing costs for investors by standardizing the forecast measures 
across analysts. I/B/E/S also gives analysts exposure to vast investor groups, including 
important institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds. Ertimur et al. (2011) 
highlight that analyst ranking services such as StarMine use I/B/E/S to rate analysts and that 
analyst rankings matter for analyst career prospects and compensation (Hong et al., 2000; Hong 
and Kubik, 2003; Leone and Wu, 2007).  
We document that analysts are more likely to report revenue forecasts in association with 
low earnings quality and high quality revenues and the effects are economically non-trivial. A one 
standard deviation reduction in the log of expense quality leads to a 13.9% increase in the 
likelihood of issuing a joint EPS and revenue forecast. A one standard deviation reduction in the 
log of revenue quality reduces the likelihood of reporting a revenue forecast with an earnings 
forecast by 10.3%. To address the concern that our results reflect endogeneity, we perform three 
tests. First, we use firm-fixed effects in our regressions to control for unobserved firm 
characteristics that may correlate with the analyst revenue reporting decision and revenue and 
                                                          
3 To illustrate, Huang et al. (2014) report that “[O]n average, an analyst issues 10.5 reports for our sample firms in 
1998, and that number increases gradually to 33 by 2008.” For comparison, in our I/B/E/S sample, analysts 
reported on average 38 EPS forecasts for the firms they covered in 1998 and close to 50 forecasts in 2013. 
Bradshaw (2011) mentions that I/B/E/S aggregates information from, among others, analysts’ reports and morning 
broker notes. 
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expense quality. Second, we estimate the regression model with changes in revenue and expense 
quality as, “changes regressions are less susceptible to correlated omitted variables problems,” 
(Skinner, 1996, p397). Third, we use instrumental variables regressions to address analyst 
endogenous coverage choices. Fourth, we repeat the analysis for the decile of largest Compustat 
stocks where analyst coverage choices are constrained.4 As a corroborating test, we also 
examined the association of analyst initiation of revenue forecast reporting with the subsequent 
quality of revenue and expenses. If analyst revenue forecast reporting and revenue and expense 
quality jointly respond to external factors, we expect revenue and expense quality to change after 
analysts start reporting revenue forecasts, but find no evidence to support this claim. Tests that 
address endogeneity produce evidence supporting our predictions.  
 To build confidence in the validity of our conclusions, we subject the results to a battery 
of robustness tests. Sensitivity tests show that our conclusions are not driven by an increase in 
institutional investor demand for revenue forecasts or by management revenue guidance. 
Further, the results remain unchanged when we employ an alternative revenue quality measure 
and remove joint issuances of earnings and cash flow forecasts from the sample. Finally, we 
confirm the positive association of revenue forecast accuracy with revenue quality, but not with 
expense quality. Earnings forecast accuracy shows a positive association with both revenue and 
expense quality.  
We recognize that standard valuation textbooks recommend that investors consider cash 
flows when earnings are of low quality (Penman, 2003), thus one might expect investors to 
demand cash flow forecasts and analysts to supply these forecasts when revenue and expense 
quality are low. However, Givoly et al. (2009) and Bilinski (2014) document that analyst cash 
flow forecasts are especially inaccurate, particularly in comparison with their contemporaneous 
EPS forecasts, when earnings quality is low. To corroborate this result, we relate revenue and 
                                                          
4 Brokers routinely cover large stocks because sell-side research is compensated out of trade commissions, which 
increase with the size of the covered firm (Irvine 2004).  
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expense quality to analyst propensity to report cash flow forecasts with EPS estimates to 
I/B/E/S and find significantly positive associations. This result is consistent with Bilinski 
(2014), who finds that analysts refrain from producing cash flow forecasts when earnings quality 
is low due to the low accuracy of the cash flow forecasts. 
This study contributes to the literature in three major ways.  First, our results highlight 
how analysts use revenue forecasts to increase the overall informativeness of their outputs when 
the usefulness of their earnings forecasts is low. A large body of research reports a negative 
association between low earnings quality and EPS forecast accuracy (Bradshaw et al., 2001; 
Drake and Myers, 2011; Hughes et al., 2008; Dichev and Tang, 2009). However, these studies do 
not focus on complementary forecasts and a reader could mistakenly conclude that analysts 
passively accept low accuracy and informativeness of their research for low earnings quality 
firms. Our study highlights how complementary forecasts, such as revenue, help analysts mitigate 
the low informativeness of EPS forecasts in these settings and raise the value of their research 
for investors. The study is particularly interesting from the point that a low quality component of 
earnings (i.e. expenses) can be associated with an increase in the supply of forecasts for another 
component of earnings (i.e. revenue).  
Second, we add to the nascent literature that examines the analyst choice to complement 
an I/B/E/S reported earnings forecast with a revenue forecast. To date, only Ertimur et al. 
(2011) and Marks (2008) have examined the determinants of reporting a revenue forecast with an 
earnings forecast to I/B/E/S. Both studies find that lower reputation analysts are more likely to 
report revenue forecasts with their EPS forecasts to I/B/E/S. Our research differs from these 
preceding studies by emphasizing both the demand and supply side explanations for revenue 
forecast reporting, i.e. how variations in expense and revenue quality impact the demand for and 
supply of revenue forecasts. Further, we report that controlling for the fact that more reputable 
analysts tend to follow firms with higher revenue and expense quality, more reputable analysts 
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do not seem more likely to report more revenue forecasts. This result suggests caution in 
interpreting Ertimur et al. (2011) and Marks (2008) conclusions. 
Third, our findings help explain the results in Ertimur et al. (2003) and Keung (2010) that 
jointly issued earnings and revenue forecasts have a greater price impact than stand-alone 
earnings forecasts.  This finding is not surprising for our results suggest that analysts rationally 
respond to investor demand and more readily report revenue forecasts to I/B/E/S when these 
complementary forecasts are most useful to investors, i.e. when low expense quality reduces the 
usefulness of EPS forecasts and makes  revenue forecasts comparatively more useful.  
Fourth, our study responds to Bradshaw’s (2011, 24–25) point that "our understanding 
of what analysts do and why they do it requires consideration of their portfolio of activities,” and 
that the easiest means for gaining additional understanding of what analysts do is to examine 
their outputs beyond earnings forecasts. Further, our findings add valuable new insights 
regarding the capital market effects of firm earnings quality (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Dechow et 
al., 2010), the dynamic interaction between earnings quality components and information 
production by analysts (Barth et al., 2001a; Francis et al., 2002; Frankel et al., 2006; Beyer et al., 
2010), and the role of financial analysts as information producers in capital markets (Ivkovic and 
Jegadeesh, 2004; Asquith et al., 2005; Ramnath et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010).    
 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Earnings is generally considered to be a better indicator of firm performance than other 
accounting measures, such as revenue (Hopwood and McKeown, 1985; Hoskin et al., 1986; 
Easton et al., 1992; Beyer et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 2010). Standard valuation models focus on 
earnings (Ohlson, 1995; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005) and “horse-race” tests show that 
earnings-based valuation multiples outperform revenue- and cash flow-based multiples (Liu et al. 
2002). However, low earnings quality can reduce the reliability and usefulness of analyst earnings 
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forecasts. Biggs (1984) identifies the income statement as the primary source of information used 
by financial analysts in earnings forecasting and previous studies document a negative association 
between earnings quality and EPS forecast accuracy. Bradshaw et al. (2001), Drake and Myers 
(2011), Hughes et al. (2008), and Lobo et al. (2012) employ accruals based measures of earnings 
quality and observe an inverse association between earnings quality and analyst earnings forecast 
errors. Bradshaw et al. (2001, 46) conclude that “sell-side analysts lack the necessary 
sophistication to understand the future implications of high levels of accruals,” consistent with 
analysts finding it more challenging to forecast earnings when their quality is low.5 Gu and Wang 
(2005) report that firms with high intangible intensity have lower forecast accuracy. Consistent 
with the prediction that earnings volatility reduces earnings predictability, Dichev and Tang 
(2009, 179) document that analysts fail to, “fully understand the implication of earnings volatility 
for earnings predictability,” and produce less accurate forecasts for firms with more volatile 
earnings. 
Studies considering the value-relevance of revenue are limited and typically consider its 
value-relevance simultaneously with that of earnings.6 The overall tone of these studies is that 
revenue is particularly important in instances where earnings is less reliable. Kama (2009) argues 
that revenue should be particularly important in environments where earnings precision is low. 
Consistent with this prediction, he reports that in high R&D intensity companies the market 
reaction to annual earnings surprises (revenue surprises) is lower (higher) than in low R&D 
intensity companies. He finds similar results for the fourth fiscal quarter, which tends to have 
greater earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008) and significantly greater discretionary write-
offs (Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Elliott and Hanna, 1996). Ghosh et al. (2005) find that investors 
                                                          
5 The term earnings quality has been broadly used to reflect investors’ abilities to assess the sources of and 
probability of recurrence of net income (see Securities and Exchange Commission Accounting Series Release 
No.159).  
6 Accounting research has a long history of studies on the value relevance of earnings (see Kothari, 2001; 
Holthausen et al., 2001; Barth et al., 2001b for reviews of this literature). This research generally finds a positive 
association between the value relevance of earnings and earnings quality (Bao and Bao, 2004; Cahan et al., 2009; 
Ecker et al., 2006).   
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rely more on growth in revenue than earnings when valuing firms that exhibit continuous 
increases in both earnings and revenue. Ertimur et al. (2003) document that investors react more 
strongly to revenue surprises of growth than of value firms, and attribute this result to less 
informative and more noisy earnings numbers for growth than value stocks. Further, they show 
that revenue surprises aid investors in identifying cases of earnings management as firms that 
barely meet analyst earnings forecasts, but have a negative revenue surprise, experience negative 
market reactions. Finally, Chandra and Rao (2008) report that the value relevance of revenue 
increases and that of earnings declines for extreme quarterly earnings surprises. They attribute 
this result to a lower informativeness of earnings for extreme earnings surprises.  
Our study joins a stream of literature that examines how financial reporting quality 
affects analyst information production. Lobo et al. (2012) find a positive association between low 
earnings quality and analyst coverage. DeFond and Hung (2003) and Bilinski (2014) report a 
significant association between earnings quality and analyst propensity to issue cash flow 
forecasts jointly with EPS forecasts to I/B/E/S.  Only two studies have considered factors 
contributing to sell-side analysts reporting a revenue forecast with their EPS forecast to 
I/B/E/S.  Marks (2008) and Ertimur et al. (2011) focus on the role of analyst reputation and 
find that low reputation analysts are more likely than high reputation analysts to report revenue 
forecasts. They contend that low reputation analysts report revenue forecasts to build their 
reputations, and that high reputation analysts refrain from reporting revenue forecasts in order to 
protect their reputations, since joint revenue and earnings forecasts can reveal the sources of 
inaccuracies in analysts’ earnings forecasts.   
While previous studies have approached the analyst revenue forecast reporting issue 
from the standpoint of analysts’ reputation, we focus on the impacts of revenue and expense 
quality. We propose that low quality expenses negatively impact analysts’ earnings, but not 
revenue, forecast accuracy and value-relevance, and thus increase investor demand for revenue 
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forecasts. Analysts respond to higher investor demand by reporting more revenue forecasts to 
I/B/E/S. This leads to our first research hypothesis: 
H1: Analysts are more likely to report revenue forecasts with their earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S when the 
quality of reported expenses is low.  
Because low revenue quality is associated with low revenue forecast accuracy, we 
anticipate that low quality revenues will reduce analysts’ reporting of revenue forecasts. This 
follows from analysts being less inclined to report relatively inaccurate forecasts to investors. 
Low revenue forecast accuracy should also moderate any increase in investor demand for 
revenue forecasts stemming from low revenue quality.  Thus, our second research hypothesis is: 
H2: Analysts are less likely to report revenue forecasts with their earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S when the quality 
of reported revenue is low.  
  
3. DATA 
We collected annual one-year-ahead EPS and revenue forecasts for non-financial firms issued for 
fiscal years 2000–2013, together with their actual values from the I/B/E/S detail files.7 We 
collected financial statement information from Compustat, and stock price information from 
CRSP.  Our sample includes 853,789 EPS forecasts and 470,345 complementary revenue 
forecasts, by 8,941 analysts and 701 brokerage houses for 3,300 firms.  Panel A of Table 1 
presents sample counts of stand-alone earnings forecasts and joint earnings and revenue 
forecasts by fiscal year.   
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
The number of EPS forecasts increases from 45,788 in fiscal year 2000 to 64,882 in 2013.  
The number of joint EPS and revenue forecasts increases almost ten-fold, from 3,391 in 2000 to 
                                                          
7 We remove financial firms from the sample because the measures of revenue and expense quality that we use are 
based on accruals and not well defined for financial firms. 
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48,239 in 2013; in percentage, 7.4% of EPS forecasts are accompanied by an I/B/E/S reported 
revenue forecast in 2000 and 74.3% in 2013, with a sample period average of 55.1%. While we 
note that revenue reporting now appears to be rather common, even in the latter years at least 
24% of the time analysts chose to not report a revenue forecast with their earnings forecast.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents the relative frequencies of stand-alone and revenue- 
accompanied EPS forecasts across 10 industries based on 2-digit I/B/E/S SIG codes.8 Stand-
alone EPS forecasts are most common in the energy and public utilities industries.  These are 
industries with mature business models where earnings are easier to forecast and more likely to 
accurately reflect firm performance. Revenue forecasts are most common in the technology and 
healthcare industries. Disaggregating earnings for these rapidly growing industries into revenues 
and expenses increases the transparency and interpretability of earnings. This evidence is 
consistent with Bowen et al. (2002), who argue that investors rely on revenue rather than 
earnings in valuing technology firms.  
 
4. REVENUE AND EXPENSE QUALITY MEASURES 
(i) Revenue Quality 
We use the receivables accrual model in Stubben (2010) to obtain a measure of the firm’s 
discretionary receivables, our proxy for revenue quality. Stubben (2010) models the change in 
accounts receivable (∆ARit) as a function of the change in revenue (∆Rit). To control for the 
impact of firm credit policies on accounts receivable, he includes the interaction terms of 
revenue change with the firm’s financial strength, the firm’s stage in the business cycle, and 
operational performance relative to industry competitors. The log of firm total assets (ln Assetsit) 
proxies for the firm’s financial strength. The firm’s age, measured as the number of years since 
the firm’s first appearance on CRSP, reflects the firm’s stage in the business cycle. The industry 
                                                          
8 The I/B/E/S SIG code is a six-digit code, representing the sector (2-digits), the industry (2-digits), and the firm’s 
operating group (2-digits).   
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median-adjusted growth rate in revenue (GRR_Pit if positive and GRR_Nit if negative) and 
industry median-adjusted gross margin (GRMit) capture the firm’s operational performance 
relative to industry competitors. The receivables model then takes the form: 
 
    
    
 = +  +   +   +  
+   +   +   +   +
2
1 2 3 4
2
5 6 7 8
ln ln
_ _
it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it it
AR R R Assets R Age R Age
R GRR P R GRR N R GRM R GRM
 (1) 
where
2
itAge  and 
2
itGRM  control for the non-linear associations of age and gross margin with 
credit policies. The change in revenue and accounts receivable are scaled by average total assets. 
The model’s residuals, νit , measure discretionary receivables.  We estimate equation (1) annually 
for each 2-digit SIC industry with a minimum of 20 firms. We measure revenue quality (RevQ) as 
the standard deviation of the firm’s discretionary receivables for years t−3 to t.   
  
(ii) Expense Quality 
We calculate expense quality by first subtracting the change in accounts receivable from current 
accruals so that the accruals focus on expense-related accruals. We then regress the expense-
related accruals on operating cash flows and the gross value of property plant, and equipment 
(an approach similar to McNichols 2002), and calculate regression residuals, which measure 
discretionary expense-related accruals. The model takes the form:  
    
− +
= + + + + +
0 1 1 2 3 1 4it it it it it it
CEA CFO CFO CFO PPE u
  
 (2) 
where CEAit stands for current expense-related accruals for firm i in year t, defined as the change 
in current assets, less change in cash, less change in current liabilities, less the change in accounts 
receivable plus the change in debt in current liabilities, CFO is cash flow from operations, and 
PPE is the gross value of property plant, and equipment. CEAit, the three CFO variables, and 
PPE are scaled by the average of total assets for the current and previous fiscal year. We estimate 
equation (2) annually for each 2-digit SIC industry with a minimum of 20 firms. We then 
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measure the firm’s current quality of expenses (ExpQ) as the standard deviation of the 
discretionary expense-related accruals, uit, for the years t−3 to t.   
   
5. REVENUE AND EXPENSE QUALITY  
AND JOINT EPS AND REVENUE FORECAST REPORTING 
(i) The Model 
We estimate the following logit model to examine the associations of revenue and expense 
quality with the likelihood that an analyst reports a revenue forecast with the EPS forecast.9   
( )
    
  
    
 
− −
−
− − − − −
−
=
+ + + + +
+ + +
+ + + + +
+ +
0 1 1 2 1 3 4
5 6 1 7
8 1 9 1 10 1 11 1 12 1
13 1 14
ln ln ln(1 )
ln# ln ln  
/ ln
ijt
it it ijt ijt
ijt it it
it it it it it
it
Pr DREV
RevQ ExpQ Star Horizon
Firm followed MV Analyst following
COV B M Age ROA Dloss
Margin LE − +  +  +1 1 2 .it ijtV Firm effect Year effects e
     
(3)
 
where DREV equals 1 if an earnings forecast by analyst j issued for firm i at time t is 
accompanied by a revenue forecast and 0 otherwise. The coefficients β1 and β 2 capture the 
associations of revenue and expense quality with the likelihood the EPS forecast is supplemented 
by a revenue estimate.  
Marks (2008) and Ertimur et al. (2011) argue that low reputation analysts report more 
revenue forecasts to build their personal reputations, while high reputation analysts refrain from 
reporting revenue forecasts to protect their reputations. Following Marks (2008) and Ertimur et 
al. (2011), we anticipate that analysts on Institutional Investor magazine’s All-America Research 
Team (Star) will report fewer revenue forecasts to protect their reputations.  We identify Star 
                                                          
9 As we examine the analyst decision to complement an earnings forecast with a revenue forecast, it is necessary to 
conduct the analysis using individual forecasts. This differs from Ertimur et al. (2011, 39), who identify the presence 
of revenue forecasts with an indicator variable equal to 1, “if the analyst issues at least one disaggregated forecast 
(that is, both a revenue and earnings forecast) during both the first half and second half of the year”. Our approach 
recognizes that revenue forecasts that infrequently complement EPS estimates likely offer limited value to investors. 
To illustrate, a revenue forecast issued early in a fiscal year provides little information on the quality of analysts’ 
consecutive EPS forecast revisions during the fiscal year.  
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status on the basis of inclusion on the All-American Research Team in the October issue 
preceding the forecast date.10 
We include Horizon to control for additional investor demand for revenue forecasts early 
in the fiscal year. We measure Horizon as the number of days between the EPS forecast 
announcement and the respective fiscal year-end.  For forecast horizon, we use log of 1 plus the 
variable to account for zero values.11  We expect joint EPS and revenue forecasts to be relatively 
more common early in the fiscal year. The number of firms an analyst follows (#Firm followed) 
proxies for task complexity. We include the number of firms an analyst follows because actively 
following and producing research reports on many companies is likely to discourage an analyst 
from devoting the time necessary to report complementary revenue forecasts.   
 We use market capitalization (MV) and the number of analysts following a company 
over the 12 months preceding the forecast date (Analyst following) to capture the quality of the 
firm’s information environment. Higher quality information environments should reduce the 
cost of producing revenue forecasts and can increase the likelihood of reporting a 
complementary revenue forecast. We include the coefficient of stock price variation (COV), 
which measures the daily stock price volatility in the last 90 days of the previous fiscal year, 
because a more challenging forecasting environment can reduce the analyst propensity to report 
a complementary revenue forecast. However, while high price volatility can discourage analysts 
from reporting revenue forecasts, it can also increase investor demand for revenue forecasts.   
                                                          
10 Ertimur et al. (2011) set their low reputation control indicator variable, LoREP, equal to 1 for analysts on the All-
America Team in the prior year or who worked for a brokerage with a Carter-Manaster rank of 9 (Carter and 
Manaster, 1990). Hong and Kubik (2003) note the high correlations among brokerage size, Institutional Investor 
brokerage ranking, and the Carter-Manaster rankings. The disadvantage of Carter-Manaster ranks is that they are 
time invariant and are based on broker “tombstone” positions in stock offering announcements for offerings made 
between 1985 and 1991, which ignores a wave of mergers in the investment banking industry in the 1990’s 
(Ljungqvist et al., 2006). Analyst rankings based on the All-America Team ranking do not suffer from this 
disadvantage.  
11 We employ log transformations to ensure more normal distributions of the variables. This particularly applies to 
measures of revenue and expense quality, which by construction can take only positive values. Further, log 
transformations account for the possibility of a diminishing impact on the dependent variable. To illustrate, we 
expect that the increase in firm size by $1 million will have a higher impact on analyst revenue reporting for the 
bottom than the top firm size decile.  
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We include the book-to-market ratio (B/M) because we expect investors to exhibit 
higher demand for revenue forecasts for growth firms as revenue forecasts are more useful for 
valuing these firms (Ghosh et al. 2005; Ertimur et al. 2003). Firm age (Age) reflects that analysts 
should be more likely to produce revenue forecasts for younger firms that are hard to value on 
the basis of earnings alone due to their short time-series of financial information (Li et al. 2009; 
Ertimur et al. 2011). Further, investor demand for revenue forecasts can vary on the basis of 
firm losses (Dloss) and profitability (ROA) as losses and low profitability can be non-reflective of 
firm value (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Collins et al., 1997).  We expect increased investor 
demand for analyst revenue forecasts for firms with high net margin (Margin) for this increases 
the impact of revenue on income. We control for solvency and firm distress risk using firm 
financial leverage equal to the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (Lev). We include firm and 
year dummy variables to control for firm- and year-fixed effects.  We include firm-fixed effects 
because the significant associations between RevQ and ExpQ and the propensity to report 
revenue forecasts can reflect correlations between unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics 
and revenue and expense quality. Year dummies are based on the calendar year of the EPS 
forecast announcement date. All firm characteristics, except analyst following, are measured at 
the end of the previous fiscal year. Analyst following is measured at the EPS forecast issue date. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. We cluster regression standard errors by 
analyst to control for the serial dependence of observations. We do not cluster by firm because 
Cameron and Miller (2015) emphasize that it is erroneous to cluster standard errors by a group 
for which fixed effects are included in the model. Appendix I provides detailed definitions of our 
variables.   
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in equation (3).  Panel A shows 
that over half of all EPS forecasts are accompanied by a revenue forecast (DREV=55.09%).  
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Mean RevQ is 0.023 and mean ExpQ is 0.053.12 Panel B shows that Star analysts account for a 
relatively small portion of I/B/E/S forecasts, the average analyst follows 16 firms, and the 
average EPS forecast is issued in mid fiscal year. Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the 
firm-related characteristics. The average firm has a market capitalization of $4.5 billion, and is 
followed by 10.5 analysts.  The mean coefficient of stock price variation is 0.094, the mean book-
to-market ratio is 0.542, the mean financial leverage is 18.1%, and the average firm age is 21 
years.13 Median ROA is 4%, and the median margin is 4.1%. Panel D reports Pearson 
correlations for the variables in equation (3). All correlations are of the expected sign and much 
smaller in magnitude than 0.8, which is the rule-of-thumb for a potential multicollinearity 
problem (Judge et al., 1982; Hill et al., 2012). 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
(ii) Multivariate Regression Results 
Table 3 presents estimation results for equation (3). Column Estimation of model (3) presents 
estimation results for the full logit model with the inclusion of firm-fixed effects. The results 
strongly suggest that low expense quality and high revenue quality are positively associated with 
analysts’ propensity to report revenue forecasts with their EPS forecasts, consistent with our 
predictions. Column ME reports the economic magnitudes. A one standard deviation reduction 
in the log of expense quality leads to a 13.9% higher likelihood of reporting joint EPS and 
revenue forecasts compared to the mean level. A one standard deviation reduction in the log of 
revenue quality reduces the likelihood of a revenue forecast by 10.3%. This suggests that the 
effects of revenue and expense quality on revenue forecast reporting are economically non-
                                                          
12 That expenses quality is lower than revenue quality is unsurprising given the higher persistence of revenue than 
expense components, e.g. Ertimur et al. (2003) highlight that “[S]ales changes are generally more persistent than 
changes in expenses” and that, “[A]ccounting manipulations of expenses may be easier to implement and more 
difficult to detect than manipulations of sales.” Other studies, e.g. Swaminathan and Weintrop (1991), also 
document higher persistence of revenue than expenses as the latter includes different expense types and charges. 
13 We use CRSP files starting in 1926 to calculate firm age, which includes a few large companies with a long time-
series of stock prices. This explains the high mean firm age.  
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trivial. Substituting industry-fixed effects for the firm fixed effects in estimating equation (3) does 
not change our conclusions (column Industry effects). The final columns in Table 3 (Changes) 
consider changes in revenue and expense quality in explaining analyst propensity to report 
revenue forecasts. Changes regressions are less susceptible to correlated omitted variables 
problems (Skinner, 1996), which helps build confidence in the validity of our results. We find 
that an increase in revenue quality and a decrease in expense quality are significantly associated 
with the issuance of a revenue forecast to accompany an earnings forecast. This result is 
consistent with our main findings for equation (3).14    
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES AND FURTHER TESTS 
In the following sections, we show that our fundamental results are unchanged under a variety of 
sensitivity tests and controls. Specifically, we consider a role for endogeneity, tests involving our 
revenue and expense quality measures individually in separate regressions, tests incorporating no 
logarithmic transformations of our revenue and expense quality measures, an additional proxy 
for revenue quality, and controls for the number of institutional investors, their percentage 
ownership, and management revenue guidance. Further, we repeat the analysis removing cases 
when analysts report a cash flow forecast jointly with the EPS forecast to ensure our results do 
not reflect cash flow forecast reporting in response to low quality earnings. Finally, we control 
                                                          
14 Lobo et al. (2012) find a positive association between low quality earnings and analysts’ coverage and argue that 
analysts respond to investor demand for information when earnings quality is low. We find a positive association 
between low expense quality and revenue forecasting. We can expect that low quality expenses substantially 
contribute to low earnings quality for revenue persistence is generally greater than the persistence of expenses. For 
example, Ertimur et al. (2003, 188), highlight that “[S]ales changes are generally more persistent than changes in 
expenses,” and that “[A]ccounting manipulations of expenses may be easier to implement and more difficult to 
detect than manipulations of sales.”  Other studies, e.g. Swaminathan and Weintrop (1991), also document higher 
persistence of revenue than expenses as the latter include different expense types and charges. In our tests, the 
marginal impact of low expense quality on analyst revenue forecast reporting is greater than the impact of low 
revenue quality on revenue reporting, which supports the prediction that analysts are more responsive in their 
revenue reporting to low expense quality. Thus, our conclusions are in line with Lobo et al. (2012). 
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for the impact of correlated errors as a result of including multiple forecasts by a single analyst 
for a specific firm and year. These sensitivity tests provide support for our main conclusion. 
 
(i) Endogeneity in Revenue and Expense Quality 
To build confidence that the associations we document do not reflect endogeneity in revenue 
and expense quality, we use instrumental variables regression. The main concern is that firms 
manage revenue and expense quality to affect analyst revenue reporting, which could then 
spuriously indicate correlation between the revenue/expense quality and analyst revenue 
reporting. As instruments, we use industry average RevQ and ExpQ measured in the previous 
fiscal year. Past industry averages are not affected by endogenous choices at the firm level in the 
current fiscal year, which makes them valid instruments in our setting. However, we expect the 
instruments to correlate with our revenue and expense quality measures as firm-level revenue 
and expense quality are shaped by industry trends (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Further, past 
industry averages should be uncorrelated with the analyst revenue reporting decision since we 
control for industry trends in analyst revenue reporting using firm-fixed effects. Column 2SLS in 
Table 4 shows that the instrumental variables regression yields results consistent with our initial 
conclusions.15 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 There may be a concern that our results reflect analyst stock coverage decisions that 
correlate with the quality of revenue and expenses. To address this concern, we re-estimate 
equation (3) for the decile of largest Compustat stocks where analyst coverage choices are 
                                                          
15 In untabulated results, we also included the entrenchment index from Bebchuk et al. (2009) as an instrument. 
Lower entrenchment means managers have less of an influence on firm reporting and accounting choices, e.g. to 
opportunistically manage earnings, which suggests a correlation between the instrument and revenue and expense 
quality. However, controlling for reporting quality, we do not see a reason to expect a correlation between 
managerial entrenchment and revenue forecast reporting. In other words, revenue forecasts do not tell whether 
managers are able to use the firm’s resources to further their personal interests at the expense of shareholders. 
Because the entrenchment index is available only till 2006 and for a limited number of firms, the number of 
observations in our sample reduces to 177,539. Regression results for this sample produce conclusions similar to our 
main results.  
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constrained. The intuition for this test is that brokers routinely cover large stocks because sell-
side research is compensated out of trade commissions and these increase with the size of the 
covered firm (Irvine, 2004). Consistent with this prediction, we find that 99% of stocks in the 
largest Compustat decile are covered by analysts as opposed to 13% coverage for stocks in the 
lowest decile. Column Largest stocks in Table 4 reports regression results for equation (3) 
estimated for this subsample and the conclusions are qualitatively similar to our main findings.  
In unreported results, we performed three further tests. First, we re-estimated equation 
(3) excluding the last fiscal quarter since fourth quarters tend to have greater earnings 
management (Cohen et al., 2008) and discretionary write-offs (Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Elliott and 
Hanna, 1996). Conclusions from this subsample are similar to our main results. Second, we 
examined the association of analyst revenue forecast reporting with the subsequent quality of 
revenue and expenses. If analyst revenue reporting and revenue and expense quality jointly 
respond to external factors, we would expect revenue and expense quality to change when 
analysts start reporting revenue forecasts, but we find no evidence to support this claim. Third, 
there may be a concern that selectivity in earnings forecast issuance, in addition to analyst 
coverage choices, could correlate with earnings quality and the revenue reporting decision. 
However, coverage and EPS forecast issuance are mechanically correlated as a higher number of 
earnings forecasts will depend on analyst coverage. Thus, by addressing the analyst coverage 
decision, we also, at least partially, address the issue of EPS forecast issuance. Further, 85% of 
revenue forecasts are issued jointly with an EPS estimate. Thus, it is unlikely that selectivity in 
the analyst decision to report EPS forecasts affects our conclusions. However, to build 
confidence that omitting revenue forecasts without an EPS estimate from the analysis does not 
affect our findings, we also redo the analysis for the sample that includes joint EPS and revenue 
forecasts as well as revenue forecasts issued without an EPS estimate. Our conclusions from this 
sample are unchanged (result untabulated).  
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To conclude, the results from Table 3 that report regressions with firm-fixed effects and 
with changes in revenue and expense quality and the tests in this section suggest that the 
observed associations of revenue and expense quality with analyst revenue forecast reporting are 
not driven by an endogenous association between analyst forecasting behavior and revenue and 
expense quality.  
 
(ii) Including the Revenue and Expense Quality Measures Individually 
Collinearity between revenue and expense quality could lead to coefficients with opposing signs 
for the two variables. Though the Pearson correlation between the two variables is not large 
(0.361), we repeat the analysis by including each measure separately in equation (3). Columns only 
revenue quality and only expense quality in Table 5 report the abbreviated regression results and the 
conclusions are similar to our main findings. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
(iii) No Logarithmic Transformations 
Column no logs in Table 5 estimates equation (3) when we use the revenue and expense quality 
proxies without log transformations. We find the coefficient estimates for the untransformed 
RevQ and ExpQ measures to be significant and consistent with our prior results.  
 
(iv) An alternative Revenue Quality Measure 
The receivables model in equation (1) considers firm size, age, industry-median-adjusted growth 
rate in revenues, and gross margin as means for capturing firm credit policy, firm financial 
strength, operational performance relative to industry competitors, and stage in the business 
cycle. However, errors in measurement of these variables can reduce the power of the model to 
measure revenue quality. Stubben (2010) argues that splitting revenue into revenue generated 
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early and late in the fiscal year reflects that sales made later in the year are more likely to remain 
on account at year-end. A simpler model of receivables considers the change in receivables as a 
function of the change in revenue in the first three quarters and in the fourth quarter.  We use 
the standard deviation of residuals from this simpler model for years t−3 to t as an alternative 
measure of revenue quality, RevQ2. As before, we estimate the receivables model annually for 
each 2-digit SIC industry with a minimum of 20 firms. Column Alternative revenue quality measure in 
Table 5 reports results for model (3) when we include RevQ2 instead of RevQ. The coefficient 
estimates on ln RevQ2 and ln ExpQ are again significant and consistent with our initial findings.  
 In calculating ExpQ, we do not include changes in sales so that the measure focuses on 
capturing expense quality. However, in unreported results, we also recalculated the expense 
quality measure controlling for change in sales and found consistent results.   
 
(v) Additional Control Variables 
Analysts can increase their revenue reporting to cater to institutional investor demand (Frankel et 
al., 2006; Ljungqvist et al., 2006). If institutional holdings are correlated with the quality of 
revenue and expenses, then our results in Table 3 could simply reflect institutional demand for 
analyst revenue forecasts. To test this prediction, we include percentage institutional holdings 
(%_Ins. Investors) and the number of institutional investors in a firm (# Ins. Investors) as control 
variables in equation (3). We expect a positive association between higher institutional holdings 
and the analyst supply of revenue forecasts. Column Institutional holdings in Table 6 shows that the 
number of institutional shareholders and their fractional ownership are positively associated with 
revenue forecast reporting, however, controlling for institutional ownership does not change our 
main conclusions regarding the associations of revenue and earnings quality with revenue 
forecast reporting. 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
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Management’s revenue guidance reduces the cost of producing revenue forecasts and can 
stimulate analysts to report more revenue forecasts to I/B/E/S.  To control for the possibility 
that revenue guidance is impacting our results, we estimate equation (3) with the inclusion of this 
guidance variable. We create a management guidance dummy (Guidance) equal to 1 if the firm 
issued revenue guidance in the 14-day period preceding the analyst’s EPS forecast and the 
guidance is for the current fiscal period, otherwise Guidance is 0.16  We collect management 
guidance from First Call. The Guidance columns in Table 6 show that the coefficient on the 
management guidance dummy is positive and significant, consistent with analysts being more 
likely to report a revenue forecast with an EPS forecast when the firm provides revenue 
guidance. Including Guidance in equation (3) leaves our conclusions regarding revenue and 
expense quality unchanged.  
 
(vi) Revenue and Operating Cash Flow Forecasts 
The accounting literature advocates the use of operating cash flow to help interpret the 
information contained in low quality earnings (Ali, 1994; Dechow, 1994; DeFond and Hung, 
2003; Penman 2003). This reflects the argument that managers will typically have less 
discretionary power over cash flows than accruals, and thus cash flow can be a more reliable 
performance and valuation measure than earnings.  Our results thus far could be driven by 
analysts being more likely to report a revenue forecast when they report a cash flow forecast in 
response to low quality earnings. To control for this possibility, in the No cash flow forecasts 
column in Table 6 we report results for equation (3) after removing joint cash flow and revenue 
forecasts from our sample. For this sample, we continue to find that low quality expenses and 
                                                          
16 We use a 14-day window between management revenue guidance and the analyst EPS forecast issuance because 
guidance should have a stronger effect on analyst decisions to jointly issue EPS and revenue forecasts shortly after 
release. Consequently, a two-week window will have more power than longer windows to isolate the effect of 
management revenue guidance on the analyst revenue forecast reporting decision.  
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high quality revenue increase the likelihood of analysts accompanying their EPS forecasts with 
revenue forecasts.   
 As a corroborating test for the prediction that analysts care about forecast quality and 
prefer not to issue low quality estimates that are of little use to investors, we use the specification 
of equation (3) to predict analysts’ choice to report a cash flow forecast with the EPS estimate. 
Cash flow forecasts are particularly useful when revenue and expense quality are low, thus we 
might expect increased investor demand for cash flow forecasts in this environment. However, 
Givoly et al. (2009) and Bilinski (2014) document that analyst cash flow forecasts are especially 
inaccurate, particularly in comparison with their contemporaneous EPS forecasts, when earnings 
quality is low. This result reflects that analysts often appear to arrive at their cash flow forecasts 
by simply adjusting their EPS estimates for depreciation (Givoly et al., 2009; Eames et al. 2015). 
Thus, concerns regarding the quality of their forecasts may reduce analyst propensity to report 
cash flow forecasts when revenue and expense quality are low.  
Column P(cash flow forecasts) in Table 6 reports results for equation (3) where the 
dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the analyst issued a cash flow forecast 
to complement the earnings forecast, and is 0 otherwise. We find that analysts are less likely to 
report joint earnings and cash flow forecasts when expense or revenue quality are low. This 
result is consistent with Bilinski (2014) and suggests that analysts refrain from issuing low quality 
cash flow forecasts that are of little use to investors, even in instances where demand for the 
forecasts is likely to be high.  
 
(vii) Random Sample Selection and Other Tests 
The dataset used for our analyses includes instances of multiple forecasts by a single analyst for a 
particular firm and year. Thus, correlated errors can influence the validity of the reported results. 
We control for correlated errors using clustering at the analyst level, but do not cluster by firm 
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because Cameron and Miller (2015) emphasize that it is erroneous to cluster standard errors by a 
group for which fixed effects are included in the model. To test if our conclusions are sensitive 
to this control for serial dependence in error terms, we perform two tests. First, we estimate 
model (3) for a random sample of unique firm-analyst-year observations. Specifically, we 
randomly choose a single forecast for each analyst-firm pair, replicate the analysis in Table 3 for 
this sample, and continue to find that the likelihood of reporting a joint revenue and EPS 
forecast increases when expense quality is low and revenue quality is high (results untabulated). 
Second, we repeat the logit regression with dual-clustering of standard errors by analyst and firm 
(results untabulated). The conclusions from this regression are the same as for the main analysis. 
Reviewing the results of our sensitivity analyses, we find consistency and essentially no 
differences with the conclusions drawn from Table 3 regarding the association of revenue 
reporting with revenue and expense quality measures.    
 
7. THE ASSOCIATIONS OF REVENUE AND EXPENSE QUALITY WITH EARNINGS 
AND REVENUE FORECAST ERRORS 
We argue that analysts report more revenue forecasts to I/B/E/S when expense quality is low to 
compensate for the low accuracy of their earnings estimates.  Expense quality, by construction, is 
unassociated with revenue forecast accuracy, thus revenue forecasts become increasingly useful 
for valuing firms when expense quality is low. Analysts report fewer revenue forecasts when 
revenue quality is low because both earnings and revenue forecast accuracy fall as revenue quality 
deteriorates. As a simple illustration of the associations of revenue and expense quality with the 
EPS and revenue forecast accuracy, Figure 1 plots mean EPS and revenue forecast errors across 
quintile portfolios of our revenue and expense quality measures, RevQ and ExpQ.  The current 
fiscal year’s absolute EPS forecast error, |EPS FE|, is computed as the absolute difference 
between the forecasted and actual EPS, scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal 
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year. The corresponding revenue forecast error, |REV FE|, is computed as the absolute 
difference between the forecasted and actual revenue, scaled by the product of the end-of-month 
number of shares outstanding and the stock price at the end of the prior fiscal year. Figure 1.a 
shows that the mean absolute EPS and revenue forecast errors increase as revenue quality 
declines. Figure 1.b replicates the analysis for expense quality quintiles. Here we find an increase 
in absolute earnings forecast errors, but no increase in absolute revenue forecast errors, as 
expense quality declines. These results are consistent with our predictions.   
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
Next, to formalize Figure 1 results, we estimate the following accuracy regression:    
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where Forecast errorijt is either the absolute EPS or the revenue forecast error.  The coefficients φ1 
and φ2 capture the associations of revenue and expense quality with earnings and revenue 
forecast errors. The set of controls in equation (4) is similar to those in equation (3) for the same 
factors that induce analysts to report revenue forecasts should contribute to analyst difficulties in 
forecasting earnings and revenue. To illustrate, we include Horizon in equation (3) to control for 
investor demand for revenue forecasts early in the fiscal year and in equation (4) since it is more 
difficult for analysts to accurately forecast earnings early in a fiscal year (Sinha et al. 1997).  
We expect Star analysts and analysts following fewer firms to produce more accurate 
forecasts (Stickel, 1992; Leone and Wu, 2007; Clement, 1999). Higher quality information 
environments reduce information acquisition costs and should result in more accurate EPS and 
revenue forecasts. Thus we include market capitalization and the number of analysts following a 
company. We include the coefficient of stock price variation as high share price volatility 
suggests a more challenging forecasting environment and should negatively correlate with EPS 
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and revenue forecast accuracy.  We use the book-to-market ratio to proxy for firm growth 
opportunities, which can make forecasting more difficult.  We include firm age as analysts can 
find forecasting earnings and revenue easier for firms with longer time-series of financial 
information (Li et al., 2009; Ertimur et al., 2011).  We include return on assets and a loss 
indicator to capture firm profitability and loss-making. We expect analysts to produce more 
accurate forecasts for more profitable and non-loss-making firms. Analysts may devote more 
effort to producing accurate revenue forecasts for firms with high net margin as revenue will 
have a higher effect on the bottom line net income. To control for firm solvency and distress 
risk, we include a measure of firm financial leverage. High distress risk can increase analyst 
forecasting difficulty and, consequently, revenue and EPS forecast errors.  The model also 
includes year- and firm-fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the analyst level. 
 Panel A of Table 7 reports that the mean absolute EPS and revenue forecast errors are 
1.70% and 5.92% of the stock price, respectively.17  Panel B reports results from regressing 
absolute EPS and revenue forecast errors on our proxies for the revenue and expense quality.  
To ensure comparability of results, we focus on the sample of joint EPS and revenue forecast 
observations. The results in Table 8 are consistent with greater absolute EPS forecast errors 
when revenue and expense quality decline. Further, we find a significant increase in absolute 
revenue forecast errors when revenue quality falls, but no significant association of absolute 
revenue forecast errors with the quality of expenses.  Table 8 results provide an explanation for 
why revenue forecast reporting increases as expense quality declines and revenue quality 
increases.  
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
                                                          
17 Higher average revenue than earnings forecast errors reflect that on average price-scaled revenue-per-share is 15 
times larger in magnitude than price-scaled earnings. This means that a one percent error in a revenue estimate will 
be on average larger in magnitude than a one percent error in an earnings forecast. In this study we focus on 
examining relative accuracy of revenue compared to earnings forecasts and on the relative value-relevance of revenue 
forecasts compared to earnings estimates with respect to earnings quality.  
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This study decomposes earnings quality into revenue and expense quality to examine their 
associations with the analyst propensity to supplement their earnings forecasts with revenue 
forecasts when reporting to I/B/E/S. We document that low revenue and expense quality 
increase earnings forecasting difficulties and reduce the accuracy and value relevance of analyst 
EPS forecasts, which in turn increases investors’ reliance on and demand for revenue 
information. Analysts respond to investor demand for revenue forecasts by issuing relatively 
more revenue forecasts when expense quality is low as revenue forecast accuracy does not vary 
with expense quality. Revenue forecast accuracy falls when revenue quality declines, which 
reduces analysts incentives to report revenue forecasts.   
  
27 
 
 
 
Appendix I. 
Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
1. Dependent variables 
DREV 
Revenue forecast dummy, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst issued a 
revenue forecast to complement the earnings forecast, and is zero otherwise. Revenue forecast 
is the I/B/E/S one-year-ahead revenue estimate. Thomson Reuters Estimates Glossary (2008) 
for I/B/E/S defines revenue forecasts on I/B/E/S as “a corporation’s net revenue, generally 
derived from core business activities.”   
|EPS FE| 
Analyst one-year-ahead earnings-per-share forecast error, computed as the absolute difference 
between the forecasted and the actual earnings scaled by the stock price at the end of the 
previous fiscal year.  
|REV FE| 
Analyst one-year-ahead revenue forecast error, computed as the absolute difference between 
the forecasted and the actual revenue, both scaled by the end-of-month number of shares 
outstanding, divided by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year.  
2. Revenue and expense quality measures 
RevQ 
Revenue quality, which is the variation in discretionary receivables for the previous four fiscal 
years measured at the end of the previous fiscal year. Discretionary receivables are measured 
from Stubben’s (2010) receivables accrual model described in equation (1). Higher values of 
RevQ associate with lower revenue quality. 
ExpQ 
Expense quality, which is the variation in discretionary expense-related accruals for the previous 
four fiscal years measured at the end of the previous fiscal year. We describe how we calculate 
discretionary expense-related accruals in equation (2). Higher values of ExpQ associate with 
lower expense quality.   
RevQ2 
An alternative revenue quality measure, which is the variation in discretionary receivables for 
the previous four fiscal years. Discretionary receivables are measured by regressing changes in 
accounts receivables on changes in revenue generated in the first three quarters of the year and 
revenue in the fourth quarter. We measure RevQ2 at the end of the previous fiscal year.  
3. Independent variables: analyst and firm characteristics 
Star 
An indicator variable for analysts selected to the All-America Research Team by the 
Institutional Investor magazine in the previous year. We use the Institutional Investor magazine 
ranking from the October issue of year t to identify forecasts issued by star analysts over the 
subsequent 12-months. 
Horizon 
Forecast horizon, which is the number of days between the earnings forecast announcement 
date and the fiscal year-end. 
#Firm followed 
Analyst firm following, which is the number of companies for which an analyst issued at least 
one earnings forecast over the previous 12 months. 
MV  
Firm size computed as the firm market capitalization at the end of the previous fiscal year in $ 
millions. 
Analyst 
Following 
Intensity of analyst coverage calculated as the number of analysts issuing at least one earnings 
forecast for a company over the previous 12 months. 
COV  
Price volatility measured as the coefficient of variation of stock price over the 90-days prior to 
the end of the previous fiscal year.  
B/M 
Book-to-market ratio measured as the ratio of total common equity over firm market 
capitalization at the end of the previous fiscal year.    
Age 
Firm age, which is the number of years between the previous fiscal year-end and the firm’s first 
appearance on CRSP.  
ROA 
Return on assets calculated as net income scaled by firm assets. ROA is measured for the 
previous fiscal year. 
Margin 
The net margin, which is the ratio of net income over the firm’s revenue. Margin is measured for 
the previous fiscal year. 
LEV 
Firm financial leverage is defined as the ratio of total long-term debt over total assets. LEV is 
measured for the previous fiscal year. 
 (The appendix is continued on the next page.) 
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Appendix I (Continued) 
 
% Ins. Investors Percentage ownership by institutional investors. 
# Ins. Investors Number of institutional investors holding the stock. 
Guidance 
Revenue guidance, which is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm issued revenue 
guidance in the 14-day period preceding the analyst’s EPS forecast, and is zero otherwise 
Firm effect Firm dummies 
Year effect Year dummies based on the calendar year of the earnings forecast issue. 
Note: 
The table shows definitions of the dependent and independent variables used in the study. We divide the 
variables into four categories: (1) dependent variables, (2) revenue and expense quality measures, (3) independent 
variables: analyst and firm characteristics. 
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Figure 1 
Analyst Earnings and Revenue Mean Absolute Forecast Errors  
by Revenue and Expense Quality Quintiles 
 
 
 
 Note: 
This figure shows the mean earnings and revenue forecast errors for quintiles based on the revenue quality measure 
RevQ, Figure 1.a, and on the expense quality measure ExpQ, Figure 1.b. Portfolio High RevQ contains stocks with the 
highest quality revenue and portfolio Low RevQ includes stocks with the lowest revenue quality. Portfolio High ExpQ 
contains stocks with the highest expense quality and portfolio Low ExpQ includes stocks with the lowest expense 
quality. |EPS FE| conditional on revenue forecast issue denotes earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast error for earnings 
estimates supplemented by revenue forecasts. |EPS FE| for stand-alone EPS forecasts denotes EPS forecast error for 
stand-alone earnings estimates. |REV FE| stands for revenue forecast error.  
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Table 1 
Earnings and Revenue Forecasts, Analysts, Brokers and Firms by Fiscal Year 
Panel A: Counts by Fiscal Year 
 
Total #EPS EPS w/o REV EPS with REV % EPS with REV #Analysts #Brokers #Firms 
2000  45,788   42,397   3,391  7.4%  2,635   233   1,484  
2001  44,462   39,390   5,072  11.4%  2,650   237   1,467  
2002  47,573   40,905   6,668  14.0%  2,661   218   1,315  
2003  50,002   35,194   14,808  29.6%  2,888   221   1,398  
2004  56,105   30,643   25,462  45.4%  2,778   267   1,545  
2005  63,941   27,610   36,331  56.8%  2,789   293   1,641  
2006  66,220   25,610   40,610  61.3%  2,815   295   1,658  
2007  68,338   23,999   44,339  64.9%  2,863   272   1,662  
2008  65,897   22,369   43,528  66.1%  2,733   259   1,615  
2009  70,557   22,261   48,296  68.4%  2,638   258   1,551  
2010  67,739   20,117   47,622  70.3%  2,503   277   1,530  
2011  69,505   18,322   51,183  73.6%  2,658   279   1,482  
2012  72,780   17,984   54,796  75.3%  2,797   266   1,491  
2013  64,882   16,643   48,239  74.3%  2,541   246   1,272  
Total  853,789   383,444   470,345  55.1%  8,941   701   3,300  
Panel B: Counts by Industry   
 EPS w/o REV EPS with REV 
Health care 33.1% 66.9% 
Consumer non-durables 47.5% 52.5% 
Consumer services 44.9% 55.1% 
Consumer durables 48.1% 51.9% 
Energy 66.8% 33.2% 
Transportation 52.0% 48.0% 
Technology 30.3% 69.7% 
Basic industries 56.5% 43.5% 
Capital goods 43.2% 56.8% 
Public utilities 60.5% 39.5% 
N 383,444 470,345 
Note: 
The table shows the total number of earnings forecasts, Total #EPS, the number of stand-alone earnings forecasts, 
EPS w/o REV, and the number of earnings forecasts complemented by a revenue forecast, EPS with REV. Column % 
EPS with REV reports the percentage of earnings forecasts complemented by a revenue forecast. Column #Analysts 
shows the number of unique analysts, #Brokers the number of unique brokerage houses, and #Firms the number of 
unique firms. Row Total reports the number of unique observations in each category. Panel B shows the distributions 
of earnings forecasts with and without accompanying revenue forecasts across 10 industry groups based on a 2-digit 
I/B/E/S SIG code.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: An Indicator Variable for Joint Revenue and Earnings Forecast Issues and Revenue and 
Expense Quality Measures (N= 853,789) 
Variable Mean Median STD p 
DREV 55.09% 100.00% 49.74% 0.000 
RevQ 0.023 0.016 0.022 0.000 
ExpQ 0.053 0.036 0.051 0.000 
Panel B: Analyst and Forecast Characteristics   
Variable Mean Median STD p 
Star 0.30% 0.00% 5.47% 0.000 
Horizon 179.926 167.000 96.194 0.000 
#Firm followed 16.262 15.000 7.935 0.000 
Panel C: Firm-Related Explanatory Variables (N=20,981 firm-years) 
Variable Mean Median STD p 
MV 4581.4 636.3 16250.7 0.000 
Analyst Following 10.472 8.000 9.017 0.000 
COV 0.094 0.075 0.069 0.000 
B/M 0.542 0.451 0.484 0.000 
Age 21.369 15.085 17.044 0.000 
ROA 0.20% 4.08% 17.84% 0.105 
Dloss 20.9% 0.0% 40.7% 0.000 
Margin −0.182 0.041 1.280 0.000 
LEV 18.1% 14.3% 18.8% 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(The table is continued on the next page.) 
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Table 2, continued 
 
 
DREV RevQ ExpQ Star Horizon 
#Firm 
followed 
MV 
Analyst 
Followin
g 
COV 
Panel D: Pearson correlations 
       
DREV 1         
RevQ −0.008 1 
       
ExpQ 0.122 0.361 1       
Star −0.024 −0.010 −0.015 1 
     
Horizon −0.004 0.000 0.009 −0.049 1 
    
#Firm followed −0.054 −0.051 −0.082 0.033 −0.001 1 
   
MV −0.023 −0.114 −0.116 0.004 0.022 −0.024 1 
  
Analyst Following 0.010 −0.136 −0.091 0.005 0.018 0.021 0.465 1 
 
COV −0.023 0.193 0.250 −0.006 −0.003 −0.035 −0.165 −0.117 1 
B/M −0.043 −0.015 −0.121 0.003 −0.010 0.051 −0.161 −0.165 0.138 
Age −0.111 −0.140 −0.266 0.010 0.004 0.055 0.355 0.142 −0.224 
ROA −0.036 −0.098 −0.292 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.175 0.166 −0.251 
Dloss 0.021 0.130 0.286 −0.005 0.001 −0.032 −0.136 −0.162 0.267 
Margin −0.025 −0.033 −0.272 0.003 0.005 0.014 0.072 0.083 −0.122 
LEV −0.100 −0.173 −0.154 0.010 −0.019 0.059 −0.127 −0.063 0.017 
  B/M Age ROA Dloss Margin LEV      
DREV          
RevQ        
  
ExpQ        
  
Star        
  
Horizon        
  
#Firm followed        
  
MV        
  
Analyst Following        
  
COV        
  
B/M 1       
  
Age −0.003 1      
  
ROA −0.121 0.126 1     
  
Dloss 0.131 −0.148 −0.460 1    
  
Margin 0.043 0.094 0.592 −0.340 1   
  
LEV −0.015 0.035 −0.193 0.099 −0.079 1      
Note: 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables in equation (3). Variables definitions are in Appendix I. N is 
the number of observations. 
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Table 3 
Revenue Forecast Reporting and the Quality of Revenues and Expenses 
 
Estimation of model (3) Industry effects Changes 
  Estimate ME p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept −9.134  0.000 −0.171 0.382 1.182 0.000 
ln RevQ −0.068 −10.3% 0.000 −0.082 0.000   
ln ExpQ 0.092 13.9% 0.000 0.118 0.000   
Δ RevQ      −0.004 0.048 
Δ ExpQ      0.012 0.000 
Star −0.472 −5.1% 0.009 −0.491 0.007 −0.343 0.000 
ln 1+Horizon −0.010 −1.4% 0.049 0.004 0.436 0.031 0.000 
ln #Firm followed −0.022 −3.2% 0.638 −0.008 0.848 0.000 0.976 
ln MV 0.188 58.5% 0.000 −0.086 0.000 0.098 0.000 
ln Analyst Following 0.054 6.5% 0.122 0.277 0.000 0.174 0.000 
COV 1.331 14.5% 0.000 1.663 0.000 0.613 0.000 
B/M 0.273 18.6% 0.000 0.001 0.976 −0.011 0.472 
ln Age 1.757 240.1% 0.000 −0.100 0.000 −0.597 0.000 
ROA −0.406 −9.6% 0.000 −0.309 0.001 −0.176 0.000 
Dloss −0.079 −4.8% 0.001 −0.071 0.061 −0.080 0.000 
Margin 0.018 3.0% 0.061 0.055 0.000 0.003 0.701 
LEV 0.148 4.5% 0.000 −0.464 0.000 −0.036 0.369 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
 No 
 
Yes 
 
Industry effects No   Yes  No  
Year effect Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N 853,789   853,789  
853,789  
p(2) 0.000  
 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
R2 26.94%    17.87%   23.12%   
Note: 
The table reports results from logistic regressions predicting that an analyst will issue a revenue forecast to 
complement the earnings estimate. The column heading ME denotes the economic magnitude of the associations 
of the independent variables by providing the impact of a one standard deviation reduction in the independent 
variable on the likelihood of reporting a revenue forecast. Variables definitions are in Appendix I. ln is the 
logarithm, p are p-values for regression coefficients based on analyst-clustered standard errors. N is the number of 
observations, p(2) is the p-value for the Wald 2-test for model specification. pseudo R2 is the pseudo R-squared. 
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Table 4 
Tests addressing endogeneity 
 
 2SLS large stocks 
  Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept 0.473 0.040 −9.931 0.000 
ln RevQ −0.299 0.000 −0.056 0.006 
ln ExpQ 0.370 0.000 0.081 0.000 
Star −0.086 0.000 −0.246 0.142 
ln 1+Horizon 0.000 0.789 −0.006 0.419 
ln #Firm followed 0.001 0.801 −0.130 0.046 
ln MV 0.016 0.182 0.225 0.000 
ln Analyst Following 0.036 0.006 −0.332 0.000 
COV 0.023 0.736 0.967 0.000 
B/M 0.021 0.292 0.747 0.000 
ln Age −0.030 0.508 2.312 0.000 
ROA −0.043 0.291 −0.789 0.000 
Dloss −0.004 0.757 −0.074 0.204 
Margin 0.019 0.016 0.049 0.050 
LEV −0.043 0.436 0.192 0.192 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 N 778,908 
 85,337 
 p(2) 0.000 
 
0.000 
 R2     26.89%   
Note: 
The table reports results from logistic regressions predicting that an analyst will issue a revenue forecast to 
complement the earnings estimate. Column 2SLS reports results from instrumental variables regressions where 
the instruments are past industry average RevQ and ExpQ. Column large stocks reports regression results for the 
decile of largest Compustat stocks.  
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Table 5 
Additional Tests 
  only revenue quality only expense quality no logs 
Alternative revenue 
quality measure 
  Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept −9.160 0.000 −8.790 0.000 −9.007 0.000 −9.009 0.000 
ln RevQ −0.055 0.000 
      
ln ExpQ 
  
0.082 0.000 
    
RevQ 
    
−1.938 0.000 
  
ExpQ 
    
1.447 0.000 
  
ln RevQ2 
      
−0.065 0.000 
ln ExpQ 
      
0.100 0.000 
Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 N 853,789 
 
853,789 
 
853,789 
 
844,457 
 p(2) 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 R2 26.92%   26.93%   26.93%   26.73%   
Note: 
Columns only revenue quality and only expense quality report logistic regressions predicting that an analyst will issue a 
revenue forecast to complement the earnings estimate when we include only revenue or expense quality measures. 
Column no logs reports results for equation (3) where we use revenue and expense quality measures without 
logarithmic transformations. Column Alternative revenue quality measure reports results for equation (3) when we use 
an alternative measure of revenue quality, RevQ2. Controls are the control variables from equation (3). 
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Table 6 
Sensitivity Analysis 
  Institutional holdings Guidance No cash flow forecasts P(cash flow forecasts) 
  Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept −9.842 0.000 −8.944 0.000 −8.963 0.000 −10.106 0.000 
ln RevQ  −0.062 0.000 −0.067 0.000 −0.069 0.000 −0.026 0.001 
ln ExpQ  0.102 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.093 0.000 −0.019 0.023 
% Ins.Investors 0.300 0.000       
# Ins. Investors  0.272 0.000       
Guidance   0.152 0.000     
Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Firm fixes effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 N 853,789 
 
853,789 
 
787,128 
 
853,789 
 p(2) 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 R2 27.89%   26.95%   29.63%   20.81%   
Note: 
Column Institutional holdings reports results for equation (3) when we control for the percentage institutional 
holdings (% Ins. Investors) and the number of institutional investors (# Ins. Investors). We divide # Ins. Investors by 
100 to avoid reporting very small coefficient estimates. Column Guidance reports results for equation (3) when we 
include an indicator variable Guidance that takes a value of 1 if the firm issued revenue guidance in the 14-day 
period preceding the analyst’s EPS forecast, and is zero otherwise. Column No cash flow forecasts shows results when 
we remove joint issues of revenue and cash flow forecasts from the sample. Column P(cash flow forecasts) reports 
results from a logistic regression predicting that an analyst will issue a cash flow forecast to complement the 
earnings estimate. Controls are the control variables from equation (3). 
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Table 7 
Earnings and Revenue Forecast Errors and Accuracy Regressions 
Variable Mean Median STD p 
Panel A: The EPS and Revenue Absolute Forecast Errors   
|EPS FE| 1.70% 0.41% 4.67% 0.000 
|REV FE| 5.92% 1.41% 15.12% 0.000 
 
EPS forecast error Revenue forecast error 
  Estimate p Estimate p 
Panel B: Accuracy Regressions 
Intercept 0.071 0.000 −0.003 0.539 
ln RevQ 0.003 0.000 0.024 0.019 
ln ExpQ 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.820 
Star −0.025 0.007 0.003 0.209 
ln 1+Horizon 0.071 0.000 0.026 0.000 
ln #Firm followed −0.003 0.000 0.000 0.644 
ln MV −0.095 0.000 −0.023 0.000 
ln Analyst Following 0.045 0.000 0.007 0.000 
COV 0.376 0.000 0.078 0.000 
ln B/M 0.049 0.000 0.038 0.000 
ln Age 0.117 0.000 0.016 0.000 
ROA −0.229 0.000 −0.041 0.000 
Dloss 0.073 0.000 0.006 0.000 
Margin 0.012 0.000 0.002 0.000 
LEV 0.071 0.000 0.011 0.000 
Firm effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N 454,401 
 
454,401 
 
p(F) 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
R2 13.25%   9.60%   
Note: 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the EPS and revenue absolute forecast errors. Panel B reports regression 
results for equation (4) where the dependent variable is the absolute earnings-per-share (EPS) or revenue forecast 
error.     
